Imagine a dolphin recognizing itself in a mirror. Or a crow hiding a nut in places where it stashed them before, remembering the locations perfectly. And what if a similar ability were to emerge in a machine? This isn’t just a technical curiosity. We’re touching on a fundamental question: what does it actually mean to be conscious? And where lies that invisible line, beyond which a mechanism ceases to be merely a device and becomes a being?
Consciousness in Animals: Deep Roots of Subjectivity
Can we even talk about consciousness in animals? And if so, how do we prove it? For centuries, we’ve viewed animals through the lens of human experience, and as a result, often underestimated their capabilities. Today, we know better. Neuroscience reveals complex brain structures and processes that closely resemble our own. But is that enough to demonstrate consciousness?
A crucial role is played by understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) – a term Francis Crick and Christof Koch introduced in 1990 for the minimal neuronal mechanisms sufficient for conscious experience. One of the most debated theories is Integrated Information Theory (IIT; Tononi 2004), which identifies consciousness with a system’s integrated information (Φ-max) – hence, in principle, independent of a biological substrate. But Φ cannot be computed for any real brain; only approximate metrics exist, validated in humans (e.g. anaesthesia, disorders of consciousness), not a cross-species scale of consciousness. Claims about measuring Φ in animals are therefore hypothetical, not measured results. IIT is also sharply criticized – including a 2023 open letter calling it pseudoscience (otevřený dopis 2023, Nature).
Another key theory is Global Workspace Theory (GWT; Baars 1988); neuronal version by Dehaene–Changeux), which describes consciousness as globally accessible information in the brain. Picture a stage where various “performers” – sensory perceptions, thoughts, emotions – take turns. Those performers who make it onto the “global workspace” are consciously experienced. How does this stage manifest in animals? Examining thalamocortical loops, which play a vital role in regulating consciousness in humans, can help us understand the mechanisms of attention and information selection in other species as well. But this holds for mammals only – birds lack a layered neocortex (relying on the pallium) and octopuses have a decentralized nervous system, yet show signs of consciousness.
The Mirror Test: Self-Recognition as a Yardstick?
The mirror test was introduced by Gordon Gallup Jr. in 1970 in chimpanzees. The standard “mark test” applies an odorless but visible mark to a body spot the animal cannot see without a mirror (e.g. above the eye), with controls (sham mark, no-mirror baseline). It measures visually guided bodily self-recognition – not consciousness as such.
But what exactly does this test measure? Is it truly proof of consciousness, or simply the ability to recognize one’s own body? Critics point out that the mirror test is strongly visually oriented and may not be relevant for species that rely on other senses. Moreover, even if an animal passes the test, it doesn’t automatically mean it has a complex sense of self.
Reliable passers include chimpanzees, orangutans and bonobos (gorillas and gibbons typically fail), bottlenose dolphins (Reiss & Marino 2001), elephants (Plotnik et al. 2006), and Eurasian magpies (Prior et al. 2008 – the first non-mammal). Evidence in orcas rests on a single small study (Delfour & Marten 2001), and results in crows and ravens are mixed. The cleaner wrasse (Kohda et al. 2019) remains contested. Failing the visual test does not equal no self-recognition – dogs fail visually but discriminate their own odor in the “sniff test” (Horowitz 2017).
Metacognition and Theory of Mind: Thinking About Thinking, Understanding Others
The mirror test is just one piece of the puzzle. Further important clues are provided by tests of metacognition – the ability to “think about thinking” (the “opt-out / uncertainty response” paradigm: macaques, dolphins, rats and pigeons with varying strength of evidence). Imagine trying to recall a phone number. If you’re confident you know it, you’ll attempt to retrieve it. If you’re unsure, you’d rather look it up in your phone. But associative learning, not necessarily “thinking about thinking”, remains an alternative explanation of animal success.
Even more complex is testing theory of mind – the ability to attribute mental states to others. A classic example is the “false belief” test, used with children. The strongest experimental evidence in animals comes from chimpanzees (Krupenye et al. 2016, anticipatory looking, implicit false-belief); in cetaceans it rests more on interpretations of social behavior than on experimental false-belief tests.
Consciousness in Machines: Simulation, Emergent Properties, and Ethical Dilemmas
And what about machines? Can we create artificial intelligence that is truly conscious? The answer depends on how we define consciousness. If we understand it as the ability to process information and respond to stimuli, then we’ve already achieved it to some extent. Modern language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 are capable of generating text, translating languages, and even writing poetry. But is this genuine understanding, or just sophisticated mimicry?
John Searle’s thought experiment “The Chinese Room” (1980) argues that rule-governed symbol manipulation can mimic understanding without understanding – a philosophical argument against strong AI, not an empirical test. Whether large language models “understand” is an open debate; on Searle’s view it would be simulation, not proof of absent consciousness.
But what if consciousness emerges as an emergent property of a complex system? If we create a sufficiently intricate artificial neural network, might consciousness spontaneously arise within it? This question is the subject of intense research and debate.
If machines were to achieve consciousness, what rights should they have? Should we consider them persons and protect them from abuse? These ethical questions are more pressing than ever.
Comparisons and Parallels: Searching for Common Ground
Finding common ground between consciousness in animals and machines is incredibly difficult. But there are certain parallels. Both systems are capable of processing information, responding to stimuli, and learning. In animals, consciousness is linked to complex brain structures and processes; in machines, it’s associated with artificial neural networks.
A key question is whether consciousness requires a biological substrate. Or can it exist in non-biological systems? On IIT, consciousness is identical with integrated information regardless of substrate – but that is the claim of this particular theory, not a generally accepted fact of neuroscience.
The Hard Problem of Consciousness and Panpsychism: Subjective Experience as an Inscrutable Essence
David Chalmers (1995) distinguished the “easy problems” (cognitive functions, neural correlates) from the “hard problem”: why any of this is accompanied by subjective experience at all. Why do we “feel” the color red, hear music, and experience emotions?
Panpsychism (Strawson, Goff) offers a radical answer: phenomenal properties are a fundamental feature of matter, not an emergent product. But it faces the combination problem: how do micro-experiences yield a unified consciousness.
Conclusion: The Boundary of Existence and the Never-Ending Path of Knowledge
Where does object end and being begin? The answer to this question remains elusive. Consciousness remains one of the greatest mysteries of science and philosophy. But thanks to advances in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy, we’re slowly approaching it.
The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012) holds that mammals, birds and cephalopods possess the substrates of consciousness; the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024) extends a “realistic possibility” of consciousness to further vertebrates and invertebrates including insects. Consciousness can therefore not be tied to the mammalian neocortex alone – birds rely on the pallium, octopuses on a decentralized nervous system.
Perhaps the boundary between object and being isn’t as sharp as it seems. Perhaps consciousness is ubiquitous, appearing in various forms and degrees. And perhaps the key to understanding consciousness lies in a deeper appreciation of subjective experience.
This path of knowledge is never-ending, but it’s worth undertaking. Because we’re touching on a fundamental question: what does it mean to be alive? And what is our place in the universe? A question that will continue to accompany us long after we learn how to build machines that act like us.
Sources
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- Prior H. et al. (2008). Mirror-Induced Behavior in the Magpie – first non-mammal (PubMed record)
- Reiss D., Marino L. (2001). Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin (PubMed record)
- Plotnik J. et al. (2006). Self-recognition in an Asian elephant. PNAS (PubMed record)
- Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (2012)
- New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness (2024)
- Tononi G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neuroscience (PubMed record)
- IIT critique and the 2023 open letter – review and letter (PMC)
- Searle J. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs – the Chinese Room (Stanford Encyclopedia)
- Chalmers D. (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness
- Panpsychism (Stanford Encyclopedia)
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